EVIDENCE: PRIOR CRIMES AND
PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE

Two recent New Mexico cases, State v. Marquez' and State v.
Ortiz,' illustrate a misunderstanding by the New Mexico Court of
Appeals of the evidentiary rules controlling admissibility of prior
crimes, prior bad acts and character evidence.
In State v. Marquez the defendant was convicted of second-degree
murder and aggravated battery. During the State's cross examination
of the defendant, evidence was admitted of an incident which occurred two nights before the murder and battery for which the
defendant was tried. While at a carnival the defendant became angry
at some carnival workers and fired six shots into the ground near one
of them, using the same gun later used in the acts for which he was
tried. On appeal the defendant argued that the trial judge improperly
allowed the prosecution to question him about this incident.
The Court of Appeals, through Judge Sutin, properly ruled that
evidence of the carnival shooting was not admissible to impeach the
credibility of the defendant as a witness under Rules 607 and 608 of
the New Mexico Rules of Evidence, 3 because the carnival shooting
evidence was not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.' But
1. 87 N.M. 57, 529 P.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 47, 529 P.2d 273
(1974).
2. 88 N.M. 370, 540 P.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1975).
3. Rule 607. [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-607 (Supp. 1975)] WHO MAY IMPEACH:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party
calling him.
Rule 608. [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-608 (Supp. 1975)] EVIDENCE OF
CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS: (a) Opinion and reputation
evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of reputation or opinion, but subject to these
limitations:
(1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and, (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or
reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than
conviction of a crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence. They may however, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness
and not remote in time, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness
himself or on cross-examination of a witness who testifies to his character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness.
4. Rule 608. [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-608 (Supp. 1975).]
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the Court held that evidence of the carnival shooting was admissible
under Rule 404(b) s to prove intent. The Court of Appeals' misunderstanding of prior acts evidence under Rules 404(a) and (b) is
evident from its holding in Marquez:
The issue to decide is whether the carnival shooting incident two
days before the crimes in question bears upon the intent of the
defendant when he shot the decedent. ... We believe it does. It
shows the state of mind of the defendant, his characteristicconduct
in the use of a gun. It was relevant on the question of intent.
(Emphasis added.) 6
Marquez raises important questions concerning the proper re-:
lationship between Rules 404(a) and (b) 7 and the relevancy of evidence to the issue of intent. Rule 404(a) establishes a general rule of
exclusion for character evidence: "Evidence of a person's character
or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving
that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion." The
time-honored policy underlying the general rule of exclusion is that
while a person's propensity to act in a particular manner may be
highly probative of whether, in a given instance, that person acted
consistently with that propensity, its tendency to prejudice and
distract juries and unfairly to surprise opponents is thought to
outweigh its probative value. 8
Dean McCormick says that "[ti his danger is at its highest when
character is shown by other criminal acts. . .. "' This policy is em5.

6.
7.

Rule
8.
9.

Rule 404(b). [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-404(b) (Supp. 1975)]: Other crimes,
wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. This subdivision does not exclude the evidence when offered for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
87 N.M. 57 at 62, 529 P.2d 283 at 288 (Ct. App. 1974).
Rule 404(a). [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-404(a) (Supp. 1975)] Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Characterof the accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the
first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
404(b), [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-404(b) (Supp. 1975)] supra note 5.
E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 446 (2d Ed. 1972), hereinafter "McCormick."
Id. at 447.
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bodied in Rule 404(b), which provides that "[el vidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith." ' 0
The use to which prior bad acts evidence should be put was nicely
articulated in the often-quoted People v. Molineux case, 11
Dean McCormick summarizes as follows:

which

[T] he prosecution may not introduce evidence of other criminal
acts of the accused unless the evidence is substantially relevant for
some other purpose than to show a probability that he committed
the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.
(Emphasis added.) 12
Evidence of prior criminal acts, if offered not to show criminal
propensity but to establish some other element in the party's case is
admissible. Rule 404(b) lists examples of such non-propensity purposes, including "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."' 3
However, the commentary to Rule 404(b) cautions that such nonpropensity use of prior bad acts evidence is limited if "the danger of
undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence......
"
The New Mexico Court of Appeals commented on the danger
concomitant with the admission of prior acts evidence in State v.
Mason.' s In State v. Velarde' 6 the Court refused to allow the admis10. Supra note 5.
11. 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (Ct. App. 1901).
12. McCormick at 447.
13. McCormick stresses that the enumeration of specific exceptions to the general rule
of exclusion of character evidence such as found in Rule 404(b), leads to a danger that
proponents of evidence will seek to "pigeon hole" it into one of the specific categories of
exceptions. Instead, it is suggested that the proper analysis is not to try to force evidence to
fit within a particular exception, but instead to carefully analyze the purpose for which it is
offered. If that purpose is clearly other than to show propensity, the evidence should be
admitted for that purpose-even if not enumerated in Rule 404(b). The merit of this
approach is that rather than conditioning admissibility on how persuasively a proponent of
evidence can characterize it in terms of a 404(b) exception, admissibility is conditioned on a
careful inquiry showing that the purpose of the evidence is non-propensity. See McCormick
at 447-448.
14. Fed. R. Ev. 404(b), Advisory Committee's Note (b) (1975).
15. 79 N.M. 663, 667, 448 P.2d 175. 179 (Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied 79 N.M. 688,
448 P.2d 489 (1968).
[W] e believe the language of the Court in Morgan v. United States, 355 F.2d
43 (10th Cir. 1966), cautioning against the unwarranted admissibility of evidence of other crimes is particularly appropriate. . . . The Court there stated:
"Evidence of other crimes than the one charged must, however, have a real
probative value, and not just a possible worth on issues of intent, motive,
absence of mistake or accident, or to establish a scheme or plan. . . . They
cannot become an occasion or excuse or device for offering evidence of other
crimes which have little or no real probative value or which is cumulative ....
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sion of evidence of prior crimes, ostensibly offered by the State to
show 404(b)-type exceptions, because "i] t . . . could serve no
purpose other than to show a disposition on the part of the appellants to commit the crime with which they were charged."' '
In Marquez the Court of Appeals concluded that evidence of the
carnival shooting was admissible under Rule 404(b) to show the state
of mind or intent of the defendant' 8 because it established the
defendant's "characteristic conduct in the use of a gun."' 9 But this
is precisely what Rule 404(a) forbids-use of a character trait of the
accused tending to show that on the day of the shooting for which
he was tried, he acted in conformity with that trait. Moreover, no
explanation appears by which the carnival shooting could legitimately show intent except by showing propensity.
In testing whether or not evidence of the carnival shooting should
have been admitted to show intent, three considerations must be
kept in mind: (a) McCormick's statement that prior bad acts evidence should have substantial relevancy before it is admitted for
some nonpropensity purpose; (b) the position of the commentary to
Rule 404(b) that the probative value of prior acts evidence should be
balanced carefully against its probable prejudicial effect; and (c) the
cautionary approach articulated by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in the Mason and Velarde cases.
"Intent" can mean many things, depending on the context of its
use. As the word is relevant to Marquez, it may be defined usefully as
"the attitude of mind in which the doer of an act adverts to a
consequence of the act and desires it to follow." 2 0 Implicit in this
definition is the requirement that intent be purposive or involve
some desired result. Thus, for the carnival shooting in Marquez to be
probative of the defendant's intent to shoot two individuals two days
later, there would have to be some logical nexus between the two
shootings. For example, suppose that A is known to dislike B intensely and to quarrel with him often. Following an argument with B
on Monday, A breaks into a pawn shop and steals a gun. On Wednesday A shoots B. Under these facts there is a logical nexus between
A's crime of stealing the gun on Monday and the shooting of B on

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
§ 220

The risk and danger is great, and this must be recognized when considering the
probative value of such evidence of specific acts offered to prove the crime
charged."
67 N.M. 224, 354 P.2d 522 (1960).
Id. at 227, 354.
87 N.M. 57 at 62, 529 P.2d 283 at 288 (Ct. App. 1974).
Id. at 62, 529 P.2d at 288.
R. Perkins, Perkins on Criminal Law 746 (1969), quoting Markby, Elements of Law
(4th ed. 1889).
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Wednesday. Because A was known to have disliked B and to have
quarreled with him recently, it can be inferred from his theft of a
gun on Monday that he intended to shoot B on Wednesday. In terms
of the definition of intent offered above, A's act of stealing the gun
shows that he adverted to and desired one consequence of this actthe shooting of B. At the trial of A for shooting B the prosecution
could, under Rule 404(b), justifiably offer into evidence A's prior
bad act of stealing the gun on Monday to show that he intended to
shoot B on Wednesday.
However, turning again to Marquez, the logical nexus between the
carnival shooting and the acts two days later which would make the
carnival shooting probative of intent is entirely lacking. The evidence
at trial showed that the victim of the shooting for which Marquez
was charged was not involved in the earlier carnival shooting. The
only connections between the carnival shooting and the subsequent
shooting were that Marquez shot the gun both times, the same gun
was used both times, and Marquez's use of the gun both times followed his involvement in an argument or disagreement. From these
facts the only statement of intent which could be formulated would
be that Marquez intended to use a gun at the slightest provocationwhich is indistinguishable from saying that Marquez had a character
trait or propensity to shoot at people when angry. The Court of
Appeal's statement that the carnival shooting showed "characteristic
conduct" of the defendant to use firearms supports the conclusion
that this shooting showed not intent but propensity and is therefore
inadmissible under Rule 404(a).2 1
State v. Ortiz2 2 also allowed admission of prior bad acts evidence
under circumstances in which the appropriateness of admission was
questionable. Ortiz was found guilty of manslaughter and aggravated
battery, both of which were committed with a firearm. The trial
judge admitted testimony by a government witness which referred to
a prior crime of the defendant. The substance of the testimony 2 3
21. Even if the evidence were relevant to intent, the three warnings articulated above
would militate against admitting the evidence. It is doubtful that the probative value of the
evidence would outweigh the great prejudice which would flow from introduction of the
carnival shooting evidence.
22. 88 N.M. 370, 540 P.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1975).
23. The exchange between prosecution and its witnesses went as follows:
Witness: "While we were cooking he was sitting in the chair, and we were
cooking, and he was laughing and saying that he had gotten away with an
armed robbery before, or something."
Question: "Now, after you cooked up the macaroni, what did you do? What
did Mike do?"
Witness: "Then we just ate and he was telling us about the trouble he had
gotten in before with armed robbery?"
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was that the witness had heard the defendant boast that he "had
gotten away with an armed robbery before." The defendant argued
on appeal that the testimony was inadmissible under Rule 404(b),
because the testimony tended to prove a criminal character trait. The
Court of Appeals held that the evidence was admissible under two
theories: (a) the testimony contained an admission by the defendant
that he had just participated in an armed robbery, and (b) the defendant's words were a statement of his then existing mental condito show the
tion, and were thus admissible under Rule 803(3)2
defendant's state of mind at the time of the shooting.
The Court of Appeals said that the defendant's statement that he
had "gotten away with an armed robbery before" was more than an
admission of a prior crime, it was an admission by the defendant that
he had just participated in an armed robbery. The Court pointed out
that while technically the defendant was tried for murder and aggravated battery, he was tried under N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 40A-29-3.1(19), the firearm enhancement statute, which requires
imposition of more severe penalties on defendants who commit
crimes using firearms. Thus, the defendant's admission that he had
just participated in an armed robbery supported the inference that he
had used a firearm earlier in the evening which was relevant to his
murder and battery trial because of the gun enhancement statute.
The New Mexico and federal rules require that where an admission
also involves disclosure of a prior bad act by the defendant, its technical relevancy must be balanced against the prejudicial effect it is
likely to have.2 s Prior crimes evidence should not be admitted
unless substantially relevant to a material question and unless its
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. 2 6 In Ortiz at least
two eyewitnesses to the defendant's crime testified that he used a
firearm. Therefore, the defendant's "admission" does not seem substantially relevant to whether or not he had used a gun. It was at best
cumulative.
Question: "Okay, what other things did Mike Ortiz say to you at the time
while you were sitting down eating."
Witness: "Just that he had friends and for us not to say anything, and that he
had gotten away with it before."
Id. at
,540 P.2d at 856.
24. Rule 803(3). [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-803(3) (Supp. 1975)].
A statement of the declarants then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation,
or physical condition ... but not including a statement of memory or belief to
prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution,
revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. (Hearsay exceptions).
25. Fed. R. Ev. 404(b), Advisory Committee's Note (b) (1975). State v. Mason 79 N.M.
663, 448 P.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1958);State v. Velarde, 67 N.M. 224, 354 P.2d 522 (1960).
26. See notes 14 and 15 supra, and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, the Court of Appeals justified admission of the defendant's comments as showing the defendant's "then existing
mental condition which is relevant to the defendant's state of mind
at the time of the shooting a short time before."'2 7 Here, the Court
of Appeals relied on State v. Borrego.2 8 However, an examination of
Borrego shows that it does not support admission of the defendant's
comments in Ortiz.
In Borrego the defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Evidence at trial showed that the defendant and some
companions drove away from a bar after having had some drinks.
They accelerated and, as they passed a nearby filling station, struck
the decedent who was standing near the edge of the service station
property. The defendant drove on, stopped momentarily, and then,
without returning to the site of the accident to render aid, drove
away. Forty minutes to an hour later the defendant returned to the
accident scene. At trial the defendant denied that he had driven too
fast, that he had driven recklessly, and that he had driven under the
influence of alcohol. During the state's case in chief the district
attorney was allowed to prove that the defendant had driven eighty
feet after hitting the decedent before stopping, and that he stopped
only momentarily before leaving the scene of the accident.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court had erred in
allowing the state to prove that he had not stopped after hitting the
decedent, claiming that it was an attempt by the state to "show a
separate and distinct offense." 2"9 The Court rejected this argument,
concluding that:
We believe evidence which is competent, relevant and material
cannot be excluded solely because it also tends to prove the person
guilty of some other crime .... The movements, conduct and admissions of the defendant for more than one and a half hours after the
accident were clearly admissible as characterizing his attitude of
mind at the time of the killing, and were so connected with the
events as to be part of the whole transaction. 3 0
Borrego does not support the proposition that evidence of the defendant's statements in Ortiz was admissible. In Borrego several
factors militated in favor of admitting the evidence of a prior bad
act. At issue was whether or not the defendant had acted under the
influence of alcohol and whether he had driven recklessly. From the
defendant's acts of driving on after striking the decedent, stopping
27.
28.
29.
30.

State v. Ortiz, 88 N.M. 370, 540 P.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1975).
52 N.M. 202, 195 P.2d 622 (1948).
Id. at 209, 195 P.2d at 626.
Id.
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momentarily, and driving off without rendering aid it could be inferred that he was either operating the truck recklessly or under
diminished mental capacity. The failure to stop and render aid was
proximate to the acts alleged; in fact it was part of the same transaction as hitting the decedent. This nearness in time made the failure
to stop relevant to a showing of the defendant's state of mind at the
time of the accident. Evidence of the defendant's conduct in failing
to stop was necessary to show what his state of mind was at the time.
Borrego's state of mind at the time of the accident was clearly in
issue because he denied driving recklessly and being under the influence of alcohol.
In comparison, in Ortiz the defendant's boast that he had "gotten
away with an armed robbery before" shows only that he had a
criminal character, was proud of that character, and was disposed to
employ weapons in the exercise of that character trait. The only
evidentiary value of the prior crimes testimony was to establish a
character trait, a purpose clearly impermissible under Rule 403(b)
and the Velarde case. Additionally, the defendant's remarks shed no
light on when or how the crime was committed. Thus, admission of
the testimony did not provide the court in Ortiz with the benefit of
additional factual details which better described the defendant's conduct. It provided only a boast that he had successfully committed
armed robbery at some undetermined time in the past.
No nexus appears between the defendant's admission and his state
of mind at the time he committed the acts for which he was tried.
Indeed, there is nothing in the Court of Appeals decision which
indicates that the defendant's state of mind was in issue. Finally,
assuming arguendo that the testimony had some probative value, its
prejudicial impact should have tipped the balance toward excluding
the evidence.
PAUL W. GRIMM

